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Abstract
In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding
voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common
voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order to quantify the quality of approximation,
it is natural to consider the candidates and voters as embedded within a common metric space,
and to ask how much further the chosen candidate is from the population as compared to the
socially optimal one. We use this metric preference model to explore a fundamental and timely
question: does the social welfare of a population improve when candidates are representative of
the population? If so, then by how much, and how does the answer depend on the complexity
of the metric space?
We restrict attention to the most fundamental and common social choice setting: a popu-
lation of voters, two candidates, and a majority rule election. When candidates are not repre-
sentative of the population, it is known that the candidate selected by the majority rule can be
thrice as far from the population as the socially optimal one; this holds even when the underlying
metric is a line. We examine how this ratio improves when candidates are drawn independently
from the population of voters. Our results are two-fold: When the metric is a line, the ratio
improves from 3 to (4 − 2√2) ≈ 1.1716; this bound is tight. When the metric is arbitrary, we
show a lower bound of 1.5 and a constant upper bound strictly better than 2 on the distortion
of majority rule.
The aforementioned positive results depend in part on the assumption that the two candi-
dates are independently and identically distributed. However, we show that i.i.d. candidates do
not suffice for our upper bounds: if the population of candidates can be different from that of
voters, an upper bound of 2 on the distortion is tight for both general metric spaces and the
line. Thus, we show a constant gap between representative and non-representative candidates
in both cases. The exact size of this gap in general metric spaces is a natural open question.
1 Introduction
“[...] and that government of the people, by the people, for the people,
shall not perish from the earth.”
— Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address culminated with the oft-quoted words above. This
single sentence gives a remarkably succinct summary of the role of a country’s populace in a
participatory democracy, identifying three distinct facets: (1) The government should be of the
people: the members of the government should be drawn from — and by inference representative
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of — the country’s populace. (2) The government should be by the people: decisions should be
made by the populace. (3) The government should be for the people: its objective should be to
serve the interests of the populace. In Lincoln’s words, the central question we study here is the
following:
If a government by the people is to be for the people, how important is it that it also
be of the people?
In quantifying this question, we observe that there is a surprisingly clean mapping of Lincoln’s
vision onto central concepts of social choice theory:
1. Who is the government of? Who are the candidates (people or ideas) to be aggregated?
2. Who is the government by? What are the social choice rules used for aggregation?
3. Who is the government for? What objective function is to be optimized?
While the exact social choice rules to be used have been a topic of vigorous debate for several
centuries [14, 15, 5, 12], the broad class they are drawn from is generally agreed upon: voters
provide an ordinal ranking of (a subset of) the candidates, and these rankings are then aggregated
to produce either a single winner or a consensus ranking of all (or some) candidates. Social choice
is limited by the severe impossibility results of Arrow [5] and Gibbard and Satterthwaite [19, 28],
establishing that even very simple combinations of desired axioms are in general unachievable.
These impossibility results in turn have resulted in a fruitful line of work exploring restrictions on
individuals’ preference orders for circumventing the impossibility of social choice.
One of the avenues toward circumventing the impossibility results simultaneously doubles as
a framework for addressing the third question: What objective function is to be optimized by
the social choice rule? The key modeling assumption is that all candidates (ideas or people) and
voters are embedded in a metric space: small distances model high agreement, while large distances
correspond to disagreement [8, 17, 9, 24, 23, 7, 27, 6]. The metric induces a preference order over
candidates for each voter: she simply ranks candidates by distance from herself. When the metric
space is specifically the line, we obtain the well-known and much studied special case of single-
peaked preferences [8, 24]. Embedding voters and candidates in a metric space has historically
served two purposes: (1) Restricting the metric space — for example, by limiting its dimension
— defines a restricted class of ordinal preference profiles, and might help circumvent the classic
impossibility results of social choice. (2) The distances naturally provide an objective function: the
best alternative is the one that is closest to the voters on average. Even when the metric space
is unrestricted, replacing the hard axioms of social choice theory with this objective function can
“circumvent” impossibility results through approximation [25], and permits comparing different
social rules by quantifying their worst-case performance.
While distances yield cardinal preferences and a social objective function, it is arguably unre-
alistic to expect individuals to articulate distances accurately. It is consequently unsurprising that
common and well-established voting rules typically restrict voters to providing ordinal information,
such as rankings or a single vote. Therefore, we view the metric space as implicit, and a social choice
function as optimizing the associated cardinal objective function using only ordinal information.
This viewpoint was recently crisply expressed in a sequence of works originating with Anshele-
vich et al. [2, 3, 4, 1, 20]. In particular, Anshelevich et al. [2] examine many of the most widely
2
used election voting rules, guided by the question: “How much worse is the outcome of voting than
would be the omniscient choice of the best available candidate?” They showed remarkable separa-
tions: while some voting rules guarantee a distortion of no more than a constant factor, others are
off by a factor that increases linearly in the number of candidates or — even worse — voters. The
simplest, and in some sense canonical, example of such distortion is captured as follows:
Example 1 A population consists of voters of whom just below half lean solidly left (at position
−1), while just over half are just to the right of center (at position ǫ > 0). The population conducts
an election between a solidly left-wing (position −1) and a solidly right-wing (position 1) candidate.
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Figure 1: The winning candidate could have thrice the social cost of the other candidate.
Because the centrist voters express their (slight) preference for the right-wing candidate, he is
elected by a small majority. However, the average distance from the population to the right-wing
candidate (1.5) is thrice that to the left-wing candidate (0.5), meaning that the majority vote led to
a loss of a factor three in the utility.
We follow prior nomenclature in this domain [26, 10, 13, 11, 2] and term this utility loss the
distortion. In examining Example 1 more closely, we identify a likely culprit for the high distortion:
the right-wing candidate was not representative of the population — he was not of the people.
Had we drawn two candidates from the population, the winner would in fact always be the socially
optimal choice in this case. If we wanted to create the possibility of recreating the above example,
we would need to move some fraction δ of the population to the right wing. If δ were large, then the
election of a right-wing candidate would not be nearly as bad according to the objective function;
conversely, if δ were small, then it would be unlikely that a right-wing candidate would run, so
most of the time, the social choice rule would select an optimal candidate. Thus, intuitively, when
candidates are drawn from the population, we would expect the distortion in the social cost to be
better than when they are not. The goal of this article is to investigate to what extent this intuition
holds.
The Model
Formally, we assume that the candidates and voters are jointly located in a (finite) metric space; the
distance between i and j is denoted by di,j. The candidates’ locations are given by a probability
distribution p, while the voters’ location distribution is denoted by q. In order to isolate the
driving question and side-step issues of specific voting rules, we focus on the simplest social choice
scenario: two candidates i, i′ are drawn i.i.d. from p, and a simple majority vote determines the
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winner between them. Voter j votes for the one of i, i′ who is closer1 to j. The social cost of
candidate i is ci =
∑
j qjdi,j . With w(i, i
′) denoting the winner of the election and o(i, i′) the
socially optimal candidate, the expected distortion of voting is
∑
i,i′ pipi′
cw(i,i′)
co(i,i′)
. Our goal is then to
understand whether and by how much the distortion decreases when candidates are of the people
(when p = q).
Our Results
We begin our investigation with arguably the simplest metric space, which nonetheless is frequently
used to describe the political spectrum of countries: the line. As we saw in Example 1, even for
the line, voting between two arbitrary candidates can lead to a distortion of 3. Our first main
result (proved in Section 3) is that when two candidates are drawn i.i.d. from p = q, the expected
distortion is at most 4 − 2√2 ≈ 1.1716, and this bound is tight. The lower-bound example is in
fact of the type discussed after Example 1, obtained by moving a suitable population mass δ from
location ǫ to location 1. The more difficult part of the proof is the upper bound, and in particular,
the proof that the worst-case distribution of voters/candidates always has support size 3. The proof
proceeds by showing that for larger support sizes, there is always a sequence of alterations that
gradually shifts the population to fewer locations, without lowering the distortion.
Next, we turn our attention to general metric spaces. For arbitrary metric spaces, the distortion
of voting can be larger. In Section 5, we analyze a simple example: just under half the population
is located at one point i, while the rest of the population is spread out evenly over n≫ 1 locations
that are at distances just below 1 from each other and at distance 1 from i. As n → ∞, we show
that the expected distortion converges to 32 . The upper bound we establish in Section 5 does not
match this lower bound: we show that for every metric and every p, the expected distortion is
at most 2 − 1652 . We conjecture that the bound of 32 is in fact tight — proving or disproving this
conjecture is a natural direction for future work, discussed in Section 6.
The significance of our upper bounds on distortion (for the line and for general metric spaces)
arises from the contrast to the corresponding bounds when q 6= p. In revisiting the improved
distortion results we prove, we notice two potential driving factors: (1) The two candidates are
independently and identically distributed. (2) The distributions of candidates and voters are the
same. One may wonder whether the innocuous-looking assumption of i.i.d. candidates alone could
be responsible for the lower distortion, without requiring that candidates be of the people. In
Section 4, we rule out this possibility by establishing a (tight) bound of 2 on the distortion of
voting when candidates are drawn i.i.d. from p 6= q, both in general metrics and on the line. The
(small, but constant) gap between the distortions of 2− 1652 and 2 in general metric spaces, and the
significant gap between the distortions of 4−2√2 ≈ 1.1716 and 2 on the line, show that government
by the people is more efficient when it is also of the people. The exact size of the gap between the
two distortions in general metric spaces is a natural open question.
1 Throughout, we will assume when convenient that the metric and distribution are in general position. Specifically,
there are no ties in any voter’s preference order, and there are no ties in any election outcome. Ties could in principle
be dealt with using suitable tie breaking rules, but the slight gain in generality would not be worth the overhead.
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Related Work
There has been a lot of interest recently in circumventing the impossibility results of voting and
social choice by approximation; see, e.g., [26, 25, 13] and [11] for a recent survey. Of particular
interest is the recent direction in which the voters’ objective functions are derived from proximity
in a metric space [2, 3, 4, 1, 20, 18]. One of the important issues is providing incentives for
truthful revelation of preferences (e.g., [18]); in this paper, we side-step this issue by considering
only elections between two candidates at a time.
Our work is most directly inspired by the recent work of Anshelevich et al. [2, 3], which analyzes
the distortion of ordinal voting rules when evaluated for metric preferences. Our work departs from
[2, 3] in assuming that the candidates themselves are drawn i.i.d. from underlying distributions,
and in particular in analyzing the case when the distribution of the candidates is equal to that of
the voters.
Anshelevich and Postl [3] consider a condition of instances that also aims to capture that
candidates are in some sense “representative” of the voting population. Specifically, they define
a notion of decisiveness as follows: Let i be a voter, and ji, j
′
i her two closest candidates, with
di,ji ≤ di,j′i . An instance is α-decisive (for α ≤ 1) if di,ji ≤ αdi,j′i for all i; in other words, when
α ≪ 1, every voter has a strongly preferred candidate. Naturally, the decisiveness condition is
applicable only in elections in which the number of candidates is large or the space of voters is
highly clustered. In our work, by considering candidates drawn from the voter distribution, we
avoid such assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
The candidates and voters are embedded in a finite metric space D = (di,j)i,j with points (locations)
i = 1, . . . , n. Depending on the context, we will refer to i as a point, candidate, or voter. The
probability for a candidate to be drawn from point i is pi; we write p = (pi)i. The fraction of voters
at i is qi, summarized as q = (qi)i. For a subset of points A, we write pA =
∑
i∈A pi to denote the
total probability mass in A, and similarly for qA. The social cost of a candidate i is his average
distance to all voters:
ci =
∑
j
qj · di,j. (1)
When candidates i and i′ are competing, each voter j votes for the candidate that is closer2 to
her, i.e., for argmini,i′(d(j, i), d(j, i
′)). The winner is the candidate who gets more votes: i wins iff∑
j:di,j≤di′,j qj ≥
1
2 . For two candidates i, i
′, let w(i, i′) denote the winner as just described, and
let o(i, i′) = argminj∈{i,i′} cj be the candidate of lower social cost. The distortion of an election
between two candidates (i, i′) is defined as
ri,i′ =
cw(i,i′)
co(i,i′)
.
We are interested in the (expected) distortion of the instance (D,p, q), defined as the expected
2Recall the discussion of tie breaking in Footnote 1.
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distortion of an election between two candidates drawn i.i.d. from the candidate distribution p:
C (D,p, q) = Ei,i′∼p
[
ri,i′
]
= Ei,i′∼p
[
cw(i,i′)
co(i,i′)
]
= 2
∑
i<i′
pipi′ ·
cw(i,i′)
co(i,i′)
+
∑
i
p2i · 1. (2)
In particular, our goal is to analyze the worst-case distortion when the candidates are represen-
tative and when they are not, that is, we want to find the gap between
max
D,p,q
C (D,p, q) and max
D,p
C (D,p,p) .
3 Identical Distributions on the Line
We begin with the simplest setting: the underlying metric space is the line, and two candidates are
drawn independently from the population of voters (p = q). We first show a family of examples (a
variant of Example 1) for which the expected distortion gets arbitrarily close to 4− 2√2 ≈ 1.1716.
Example 2 The metric space is the line, denoted by L. There are p1 = 12 − ǫ voters at location
x1 = −1, p2 = 1− 1√2 voters at x2 = ǫ, and p3 =
1√
2
− 12+ǫ voters at x3 = 1. This example is obtained
from Example 1 by moving a suitable fraction of voters from location x2 = ǫ to x3 = 1, carefully
trading off between two factors: (1) decreasing the pairwise distortion between the candidates at −1
and 1, but (2) increasing the chance of a such an election happening.
-1 10
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Figure 2: The worst case instance on the line with C (L,p,p) = 4− 2√2.
Because the voters at x2 = ǫ are slightly closer to 1 than to -1, a candidate drawn from x3 = 1
will win against a candidate drawn from x1 = −1. The costs of the two candidates are
c1 = p2d1,2 + p3d1,3 = p2 + 2p3 +O(ǫ) =
1√
2
+O(ǫ),
c3 = p1d1,3 + p2d2,3 = 2p1 + p2 −O(ǫ) = 2− 1√
2
−O(ǫ).
Because the candidates are drawn independently from p, the election between x1 and x3 happens
with probability 2p1p3. In all other cases (when a candidate from x2 runs against one from x1 or
x3, or both candidates are from the same location), the voters elect the socially better candidate.
Therefore, the expected distortion is
C (L,p,p) = (1− 2p1p3) · 1 + (2p1p3) · c3
c1
= 4− 2
√
2−O(ǫ).
Our first main result is that Example 2 gives the worst distortion on the line.
Theorem 3 For any distribution p, we have C (L,p,p) ≤ 4− 2√2.
We will prove Theorem 3 in Section 3.2. In preparation, in Section 3.1, we first provide some
structural characterization results about the voting behavior and social cost on the line.
6
3.1 Characterizing the Structure of Voting on the Line
Given a distribution on the line with support size n, we label the support points as 1, . . . , n from
left to right. Let m be the index of the median3, and let L = {1, . . . ,m−1} and R = {m+1, . . . , n}
denote the locations to the left and to the right of the median, respectively. By the definition of
the median, pL <
1
2 < pL + pm and pR <
1
2 < pm + pR.
Lemma 4 If two candidates (x, y) are drawn, the one closer to m wins the election.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that dx,m < dy,m and x ∈ L ∪ {m}; that is, x lies
to the left of the median, or x is the median. There are two cases depending on whether y is also
to the left of m.
1. If y ∈ L, then all voters to the right of the median as well as the median are going to vote
for x, so x gets a pm + pR >
1
2 fraction of the votes.
2. If y ∈ R, then all voters in L as well as m are going to vote for x, so x gets a pL + pm > 12
fraction of the votes.
In either case, x gets more than half of the votes and wins the election.
The next lemma characterizes the social cost ordering on the line.
Lemma 5 If x, y are on the same side of the median m (including one of them being the median),
the one closer to m has smaller social cost.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that x ∈ L∪{m}, y ∈ L, and dx,m < dy,m. Intuitively,
x has smaller social cost because more than half of the population need to first get to x before they
can get to y. Formally, we have
cx =
∑
i∈L
pidi,x +
∑
i∈{m}∪R
pidi,x =
∑
i∈L
pidi,x +
∑
i∈{m}∪R
pi (di,y − dx,y)
pL≤pm+pR≤
∑
i∈L
pi (di,x − dx,y) +
∑
i∈{m}∪R
pidi,y
△−inequality
≤
∑
i∈L
pidi,y +
∑
i∈{m}∪R
pidi,y = cy.
As a simple corollary of Lemmas 4 and 5, notice that if two candidates (x, y) are drawn from the
same side of the median (including when one of them is the median), majority voting always elects
the socially better candidate. This observation allows us to simplify the expression for C (D,p,p)
on the line,
C (L,p,p) =
∑
i∈[n]
p2i +
∑
i,j∈[n]
2pipjri,j = 1 +
∑
i∈L,j∈R
2pipj(ri,j − 1).
3Recall that we assume the instance to be in general position, which implies uniqueness of the median.
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3.2 Proof of the Upper Bound of 4− 2√2
In this section, we prove Theorem 3, showing that the worst-case distortion on the line is 4− 2√2.
The high-level idea is that, given any instance (L,p) with support size larger than 3, we can
iteratively reduce its support size to 3 using a series of operations (Lemmas 6, 7 and 8), while
preserving (or increasing) C (L,p,p). Once the instance has support size 3, we can optimize the
locations and probabilities of these 3 points.
As before, let m be the index of the median, and let L = {1, . . . ,m−1} and R = {m+1, . . . , n}
denote the points to the left and to the right of the median, respectively. We can assume that both
L and R are non-empty; otherwise, the median is the leftmost or rightmost point, and we always
elect the socially better candidate.
The proof proceeds by moving probability mass within L or within R to merge points until
|L| = |R| = 1. None of the operations in this section will change the median m, so the election
results are still decided by the candidates’ distance to m.
L R
mx∗ y∗
mx∗ y∗
mx∗ y∗
mx∗ y∗
Lemma 6
Lemma 7
Lemma 8
Figure 3: An example of the series of operations (Lemmas 6, 7 and 8) used to reduce the support size
to 3 on the line, while preserving or increasing C (L,p,p). Probability mass is roughly represented
by sizes of ellipses.
When shifting the probability mass, we will not be able to guarantee that no pairwise election
sees a decrease in distortion. Instead, we use a more global argument to show that the operation
increases the distortion on average. We define ri to be the expected distortion conditioned on one
of the candidates being i, and the other candidate being drawn according to p, that is,
ri =
∑
j
pjri,j .
We will show that so long as pL, pm, and pR remain the same, C (L,p,p) is a linear function of the
average distortion on one side of the median. By Lemmas 4 and 5, the pairwise distortion can be
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larger than 1 only if two candidates are on different sides of m; therefore,
C (L,p,p) = 1 + 2
∑
i∈L,j∈R
pipj(ri,j − 1) = 1 + 2
∑
i∈L,j∈[n]
pipj(ri,j − 1) = 1− 2pL + 2
∑
i∈L
piri,
C (L,p,p) = 1− 2pR + 2
∑
i∈R
piri.
The two preceding equations formalize that whenever pL and pR stay constant and
∑
i∈R piri (or∑
i∈R piri) does not decrease, C (L,p,p) also does not decrease. This fact is exploited repeatedly
in the proofs of the following lemmas.
Lemma 6 Let y∗ = argmaxy∈R ry be the “worst” candidate in R. Then, moving all probability
mass from indices y > y∗ to y∗ does not decrease C (L,p,p). (A symmetric claim holds for the
worst candidate x∗ = argmaxx∈L rx.)
Proof. Since the operation does not change pL or pR, it is sufficient to show that
∑
y∈R pyry does
not decrease. By Lemma 4, all election results between pairs i, j ≤ y∗ are preserved. Let p′i, c′i, and
r′i denote the corresponding values of pi, ci and ri after the operation. Then, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ y∗,
r′i,j =
c′
w(i,j)
c′
o(i,j)
=
cw(i,j) −
∑
y>y∗ pydy,y∗
co(i,j) −
∑
y>y∗ pydy,y∗
≥ cw(i,j)
co(i,j)
= ri,j.
After the shift of probability mass, y∗ is the largest index. Consider m < y ≤ y∗. Using that
elections between two candidates on the same side of the median always result in the socially better
candidate winning, we bound
r′y =
∑
1≤i≤y∗
p′ir
′
i,y =
∑
i∈L
pir
′
i,y + (1− pL) · 1 ≥
∑
i∈L
piri,y + (1− pL) = ry.
Any candidates that used to be at y > y∗ are now at y∗, and y∗ used to be the worst candidate
in R. Hence, for all of the probability mass from locations y > y∗, the expected distortion also
weakly increases. Combining these two cases, we get∑
m<y≤y∗
p′yr
′
y =
∑
m<y<y∗
pyr
′
y +
∑
y∗≤y≤n
pyr
′
y∗ ≥
∑
m<y≤y∗
pyry +
∑
y∗≤y≤n
pyry∗ ≥
∑
y∈R
pyry.
Lemma 6 can be applied repeatedly unless the two worst candidates x∗ and y∗ are the leftmost
and rightmost points. We next show that in that case, either all the probability mass of L or all
the probability mass of R can be moved to x∗ or y∗, respectively.
Lemma 7 Let x∗ and y∗ be the worst candidates in L and R, respectively. Assume w.l.o.g. that
dm,x∗ < dm,y∗. If x
∗ = 1 and y∗ = n, then moving all probability mass from R to y∗ does not
decrease C (L,p,p).
Proof. As for the previous lemma, because we are only shifting probability mass within R, it is
sufficient to show that
∑
y∈R pyry does not decrease. Because more probability mass moved closer
to y∗, we have that c′y∗ ≤ cy∗ , and because probability mass moved away from L (to the right), we
get that c′i ≥ ci for all i ∈ L ∪ {m}.
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By Lemma 4, y∗ loses all of his elections both before and after the move. Moreover, by Lemma 5,
we get ry∗ = (1−pL)+
∑
i∈L piri,y∗ before the move, and r
′
y∗ = (1−p′L)+
∑
i∈L p
′
ir
′
i,y∗ = (1−pL)+∑
i∈L pir
′
i,y∗ after the move. Since r
′
i,y∗ =
c′i
c′
y∗
≥ ci
cy∗
= ri,y∗ for all i ∈ L, we get that r′y∗ ≥ ry∗ .
Finally, because y∗ used to be the worst candidate in R, and after the move of probability mass is
the only candidate in R, we bound
p′y∗r
′
y∗ =
∑
y∈R
pyr
′
y∗ ≥
∑
y∈R
pyry∗ ≥
∑
y∈R
pyry,
which concludes the proof.
Once neither Lemma 6 nor Lemma 7 can be applied, we can apply Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 Let x∗ = 1, y∗ = n be the worst candidates in L and R, respectively. If |L| > 1, |R| = 1
and dm,y∗ > dm,x∗, then the size of L can be reduced by 1 without decreasing C (L,p,p).
Proof. Notice that m = n − 1 and L = {1, . . . , n − 2}. Recall that the only elections in which
the winner could be socially inferior are those involving n and a candidate x ∈ L. Also, because
dm,n > dm,x∗ ≥ dm,i for all i, we obtain that n loses all elections. We split the proof into two cases.
1. If there exists an i ∈ L with ci ≤ cn, then in particular, cn−2 ≤ cn. Thus, candidate n − 2
wins all elections against i ≤ n− 2 (as he should) and against n (as he should), while losing
to m (as he should). This implies that rn−2 = 1.
Consider the effect of moving all probability mass from n−2 to the median m = n−1. First,
all election results remain the same. The contribution of the probability mass that used to
be at n − 2 to the distortion does not change. (It was 1 before and is still 1.) Furthermore,
cn decreases while ci increases for all i < n − 2. Because n loses all pairwise elections, the
overall distortion can only increase.
2. If ci > cn for all i ∈ L, the expected distortion is exactly
C (L,p,p) = 1− 2pnpL + 2pn
∑
i∈L
pi
ci
cn
.
Let xi denote the position of point i on the line. Since |L| > 1, we have a point at position
x2 in L with x1 < x2 < x3. Writing Y :=
∑
j 6=2 pj|xn − xj | and Xi :=
∑
j 6=2 pj |xi − xj|, we
get that ci = Xi + p2|xi − x2|, and cn = Y + p2(xn − x2). Hence, we can rewrite
C (L,p,p) = 1− 2pnpL + 2pn
∑
i∈L
pi
Xi + p2|xi − x2|
Y + p2(xn − x2)
= 1− 2pnpL + 2pn
Y + p2xn − p2x2 ·
(∑
i∈L
piXi − p2(p1x1 −
n−2∑
i=3
pixi) + p2x2(p1 −
n−2∑
i=3
pi)
)
= 1− 2pnpL + 2pn
(Y/p2 + xn)− x2 ·
(∑
i∈L
piXi/p2 − (p1x1 −
n−2∑
i=3
pixi) + x2(p1 −
n−2∑
i=3
pi)
)
.
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Treating everything except x2 as constant, this expression is of the form
B+βx2
A−x2 for all x2 ∈
[x1, x3], where A, B, and β are constants independent of x2. The derivative of this expression
with respect to x2 is
βA+B
(A−x2)2 ; its sign is always the sign of βA + B. If βA + B > 0, then
increasing x2 to x3 strictly increases the expected distortion; otherwise, x2 can be decreased
to x1 without decreasing the expected distortion. In either case, we reduce the size of L by
1.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemmas 6, 7 and 8, the worst-case instance (L,p,p) has support size
(at most) 3. Let x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 be the locations on the line. By rescaling and mirroring, we may
assume without loss of generality that x1 = 0, x3 = 1, and x2 >
1
2 .
If x2 were not the median of the distribution, then the socially better candidate would always
win, giving C (L,p,p) = 1. So in a worst-case distribution, x2 must be the median, and the
socially worse candidate must win the election between x1 and x3. Because x2 >
1
2 , x3 is closer to
the median, so he wins the election between x1 and x3; therefore, x1 must have lower cost than x3.
The expected distortion is
C (L,p,p) = (1− 2p1p3) · 1 + 2p1p3 · c3
c1
= (1− 2p1p3) + 2p1p3 · p1 + p2(1− x2)
p2x2 + p3
.
This expression is monotonically decreasing in x2 and monotonically increasing in p1, so it is
maximized when we take the limit x2 → 12 and p1 → 12 . In particular,
C (L,p,p) ≤ (1− p3) + p3 · 1/2 + p2/2
p2/2 + p3
= (1− p3) + p3 · 3− 2p3
1 + 2p3
,
which is maximized at p3 =
√
2−1
2 (as in Example 2), where it attains a value of 4− 2
√
2.
4 Different Distributions
In this section, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the worst-case distortion of voting, when two can-
didates are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution p which may be different from the voter distribution q.
This ratio is tight for both general metric spaces and the line, and the lemmas we prove in this
section apply to arbitrary metric spaces.
We begin with an example on the line (a variant of Example 1) which establishes the lower
bound of 2. The candidate distribution p has probability 1/2 at position −1, and the other 1/2 at
position 1. The voter distribution q has a (1/2− ǫ) fraction of the voters at position −1, while the
remaining voters are just to the right of center at position ǫ > 0. With probability 1/2, we draw
two different candidates, and the distortion is 3 − O(ǫ); otherwise, we draw two candidates from
the same location, getting a distortion of 1. Therefore, the expected distortion of the instance is
2−O(ǫ)→ 2 as ǫ→ 0.
The challenge is to establish the matching upper bound. In proving the upper bound, some of
the techniques we establish will be useful in Section 5.
Theorem 9 For all instances (D,p, q), the expected distortion C (D,p, q) is at most 2.
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The overall proof structure is as follows. First, we show in Lemma 10 that if i = w(i, i′),
then ci ≤ 3ci′ . That is, while the election winner can be socially worse, he cannot be too much
worse.4 Lemma 10 is the only place where we use the metric structure and the voter distribution.
Subsequently, we rewrite the social cost function C (D,p, q) accordingly, and then treat the costs
as completely arbitrary numbers.
Second, in Lemma 11, we prove that if all pairwise elections have distortion at most 1 ≤ α ≤ 3,
then C (D,p, q) ≤ (1 + α)/2. (While in this section, we will only use the lemma with α = 3, the
version with general α constitutes a key step in Section 5.)
Lemma 10 ([2]) Let i = w(i, i′). Then, ci ≤ 3ci′ .
Proof. In the following derivation, we will use that:
• Because i beats i′, at least half of the voters are at least as close to i as to i′.
• For any voter j who is at least as close to i as to i′, the triangle inequality implies that
di′,i ≤ di′,j + dj,i ≤ 2di′,j.
Then, we can bound ci as follows:
ci =
∑
j:di,j≤di′,j
qj · di,j +
∑
j:di,j>di′,j
qj · di,j
△−inequality
≤
∑
j:di,j≤di′,j
qj · di′,j +
∑
j:di,j>di′,j
qj · (di′,j + di,i′)
i beats i′≤
∑
j:di,j≤di′,j
qj · (di′,j + di,i′) +
∑
j:di,j>di′,j
qj · di′,j
≤
∑
j:di,j≤di′,j
qj · (3di′,j) +
∑
j:di,j>di′,j
qj · di′,j
≤ 3ci′ .
Lemma 11 For any 1 ≤ α ≤ 3 and any instance (D,p, q), if ri,j = cw(i,j)co(i,j) ≤ α for all (i, j), then
C (D,p, q) ≤ 1+α2 .
Proof. Consider an instance (D,p, q) and its associated costs c. Without loss of generality,
assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. For each candidate i, let ℓi = max{j | cj ≤ αci}. Notice that by
the assumption that ri,j ≤ α for all i, j, whenever j > ℓi, we have that w(i, j) = o(i, j), resulting
in a cost ratio of 1. We can therefore bound the expected distortion (minus 1) as follows:
C (D,p, q)− 1 ≤ 2
∑
i<j≤ℓi
pipj ·
(
cj
ci
− 1
)
=: Ĉ(p, c, α). (3)
The upper bound Ĉ(p, c, α) assumes that the worse candidate wins whenever the two candidates’
social costs are within a factor of α of each other. Note that this upper bound Ĉ(p, c, α) makes no
4Lemma 10 is a special case of the more general result [2, Theorem 4]; we present a self-contained proof here for
completeness.
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more reference to distances or voter distributions. It depends on a distribution over candidates and
a cost vector, both of which can be arbitrary, and it assumes that all elections whose candidates’
costs are more than a factor α apart choose the socially better candidate, while all other elections
choose the socially worse candidate.
We will now argue that Ĉ(p, c, α) is at most α−12 . First, we show that the expression is max-
imized by moving probability mass so that ci and cj are at most a factor α apart for every i and
j in the support of p. Suppose that there exists a pair i < j in the support of p with j > ℓi, i.e.,
with cj > αci. Consider moving ǫ probability mass from pi to pj , where a negative value of ǫ moves
probability mass from pj to pi; call the resulting probability vector p(ǫ). Because our choice of i
and j avoids the bilinear term pipj in (3), Ĉ(p(ǫ), c, α) is a linear function of ǫ. Therefore, the
expression is maximized at an extreme, i.e., by moving all the probability mass from one of i and
j to the other.
Once all points in the support of p are at most a factor α apart in social cost, the expression
for Ĉ(p, c, α) in (3) becomes a sum over all pairs of points. Assume that the support of p has size
n′ ≥ 3, and associated costs c1 < c2 < · · · < cn′ . (The inequalities can be assumed to be strict,
because two points i, i′ with the same cost can be merged without affecting the value Ĉ(p, c, α).)
Considering all terms except c2 as constants, Ĉ(p, c, α) is of the form β1 + β2c2 + β3/c2 (with
β2, β3 ≥ 0), which is convex in c2. In particular, it attains its maximum at c2 = c1 or c2 = c3. In
either case, we can merge the probability mass of point 2 with 1 or 3, reducing the support size by
1 without decreasing Ĉ(p, c, α). By repeating such merges, we eventually arrive at a distribution
with support size 2 and c2 ≤ αc1. Finally, we can bound
C (D,p, q) = 1 + Ĉ(p, c, α) ≤ 1 + 2p1(1− p1) · (α− 1) ≤ 1 + 1
2
(α− 1) = 1 + α
2
.
5 Identical Distributions in General Metric Spaces
In this section, we examine the setting where the underlying metric space is arbitrary, and the
candidates are drawn independently from the population of voters. We establish the following
main theorem:
Theorem 12 The worst-case distortion sup(D,p,p)C (D,p,p) is between 32 and 2− 1652 .
Key to the upper bound portion of this theorem is the following lemma.
Lemma 13 Assume that δ ≤ 1100 . Let (D,p,p) be an instance with maximum pairwise distortion
(exactly) 3− δ. Then, C (D,p,p) ≤ 32 + 9
√
δ.
We prove Lemma 13 in Section 5.2. That proof relies on the following structural characterization:
if a pair of candidates has distortion 3 − δ for sufficiently small δ, then the instance must be very
structured: nearly half the probability mass must be concentrated very close to the socially optimal
candidate, and most of the remaining candidates must be nearly equidistant to the two candidates.
Proof of Theorem 12. We begin by proving the lower bound, by constructing a family of in-
stances whose distortion converges to 32 . We label the n+ 1 points {0, 1, . . . , n}. We set p0 = 1−ǫ2 ,
and all other pi =
1+ǫ
2n . The distances
5 are d0,i = 1 for all i > 0, and di,j = 1 − ǫ for all i, j > 0.
See Figure 4 for an illustration.
5To avoid tie breaking issues, consider the distances as perturbed by distinct and very small amounts.
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Figure 4: A class of instances for general metric spaces in which C (D,p,p) approaches 32 .
This way, all voters/candidates in the set {1, . . . , n} prefer each other over the voter/candidate
0. Therefore, even though candidate 0 is socially optimal (with a cost c0 =
1
2 + O(ǫ)), he loses to
any other candidate in the election; the other candidates’ costs are ci = 1−O(1/n) −O(ǫ).
With probability 12 − O(ǫ), an election occurs between candidate 0 and some other candidate
i > 0, resulting in distortion 2−O(ǫ)−O(1/n). In the other cases (two candidates from 0, or two
candidates i, j > 0), the distortion is at least 1. Hence, the overall expected distortion is at least
(12 −O(ǫ)) · (2−O(ǫ)−O(1/n)) + 12 · 1 = 32 −O(ǫ)−O(1/n). As ǫ→ 0 and n→∞, the distortion
approaches 32 .
For the upper bound, let δ = 1326 and consider the following two cases. If all pairwise elections
have distortion at most 3−δ, then Lemma 11 implies that the overall expected distortion C (D,p,p)
is at most 2−δ/2 = 2− 1652 . If some pair of candidates has distortion at least 3−δ, then Lemma 13
implies that the overall expected distortion is at most 32 +9
√
δ ≤ 2− 1652 . Together, these two cases
complete the proof of the theorem.
As mentioned above, the key insight in the proof of Lemma 13 is that when a pair of candidates
has rx,y ≥ 3 − δ, nearly half the probability mass must be concentrated very close to the socially
optimal candidate, and most of the remaining candidates must be nearly equidistant to the two
candidates. Trading off these four sources of approximation makes the proof of the lemma fairly
complex. To illustrate the key ideas more cleanly, we therefore begin by proving the following
special case of Lemma 13 with δ = 0.
Lemma 14 Let (D,p,p) be an instance. If there exists a pair of candidates x, y with cw(x,y)
co(x,y)
= 3,
then C (D,p,p) = 1.5.
As before, we let pA =
∑
i∈A pi denote the total probability mass in A. In addition, throughout
this section, pA is the conditional candidate/voter distribution given that candidate i is drawn from
A; that is, (pA)i = pi/pA. We use di,A to denote the average distance from i to the set A, i.e.,
di,A = Ej∼pA [di,j ].
5.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Assume that y = w(x, y) and x = o(x, y). We assume without loss of generality that dx,y = 2.
The fact that cy = 3cx implies very stringent conditions on the instance: we will begin by showing
14
that half of the probability mass must be at x, x is socially optimal, and all other locations are at
distance6 1 from x and y.
Let Y be the set of voters preferring y over x, and X = Y the set of voters preferring x over y.
Then, we can bound
cy = pY dy,Y + pXdy,X
△−inequality
≤ pY dy,Y + pX(dy,x + dx,X)
y beats x
≤ pY (dy,Y + dy,x) + pXdx,X
△−inequality
≤ pY (dy,Y + dy,Y + dx,Y ) + pXdx,X
≤ 3(pY dx,Y + pXdx,X)
= 3cx.
Because cy = 3cx by assumption, all of the inequalities must be tight, which implies the follow-
ing:
1. By the second (in)equality, pY = pX =
1
2 .
2. By the final (in)equality, dx,Y = dy,Y , so all points in Y are equidistant from x and y.
Furthermore, because pXdx,X = 3pXdx,X , we get dx,X = 0.
3. By the first (in)equality, dy,X = dy,x + dx,X = 2.
4. By the third (in)equality, dy,x = dy,Y +dx,Y , so (because dy,Y = dx,Y and by triangle inequal-
ity), dy,i = dx,i = 1 for all i ∈ Y .
Because dx,X = 0, we can write px =
1
2 . We then have that cx =
1
2 , and cy =
3
2 . Let A denote
the set of all candidates other than x. The expected distortion is then
C (D,p,p) = p2x + 2pxpAEi∼A [ri,x] + p2AEi,j∼A [ri,j ]
= 1/4 + 1/4 · Ei,j∼A [ri,x + rj,x + ri,j ] .
Let ∆i,j = ri,x+rj,x+ri,j. We will show that ∆i,j ≤ 5 for all i, j ∈ A, and thus C (D,p,p) ≤ 1.5.
The three key properties we exploit repeatedly are the following.
1. x is socially optimal, i.e., ci ≥ cx for all i ∈ A. This is because cx = 12 , and for each i ∈ A, at
least all voters at x are at distance 1.
2. ci ≤ 3cx for all i ∈ A. This is because di,A ≤ di,x + dx,A = 2 and di,x = 1, giving a total cost
of at most 32 .
3. If some i ∈ A beats x, then ci ≤ 2cx. This is because everyone in A has to vote for i, implying
that di,A ≤ 1, giving ci ≤ 1.
6In a sense, this extreme example does rely on tie breaking. Since we are proving an upper bound here, this is not
a concern.
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Now fix some pair i, j ∈ A, and assume without loss of generality that i wins the election over
j. For each of the three elections that contribute to ∆i,j (i vs. x, j vs. x, i vs. j), there is a term
which is 1 if the election chooses the socially better candidate (e.g., w(i, x) = o(i, x)), and at most 3
otherwise. Thus, if we ever had ∆i,j > 5, at least two of the three elections would have to produce
the socially worse candidate as a winner, e.g., w(i, x) 6= o(i, x). We distinguish three possible cases.
1. If x beats j, then i must beat x and (because we assumed i to beat j) j must have lower cost
than i. Because x is socially optimal (in particular having lower social cost than j), using
that ci ≤ 2cx, we have that
∆i,j = ri,x + rj,x + ri,j =
ci
cx
+ 1 +
ci
cj
≤ 1 + ci
cx
+
ci
cx
≤ 1 + 2 + 2 = 5.
2. If x beats i, then j must beat x and have lower cost than i. Then we obtain the expression.
∆i,j = ri,x + rj,x + ri,j = 1 +
cj
cx
+
ci
cj
.
Treating cj as a variable t, we have an expression of the form
t
cx
+ ci
t
, which is convex and hence
maximized at an extreme point (t = ci or t = cx), giving an upper bound of 1 + 1 +
ci
cx
≤ 5.
3. Finally, we have the case that both i and j beat x (implying that ci ≤ 2cx and cj ≤ 2cx). If
i has lower social cost than j, we can bound
∆i,j = ri,x + rj,x + ri,j ≤ 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.
Otherwise we have cx ≤ cj < ci, and obtain the expression ∆i,j = cicx +
cj
cx
+ ci
cj
. Again, the
expression
cj
cx
+ ci
cj
is maximized at cj = cx or cj = ci, in both cases giving us a bound of
ci
cx
+ 1 + ci
cx
≤ 5.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 13
The proof of Lemma 13 follows the same roadmap as the proof of Lemma 14, except that we no
longer have a point with probability mass 1/2. Instead, close to half of the probability mass will
be in a ball B of small radius around x. The three key properties used to bound ∆i,j will then be
replaced with approximate (slightly inferior) versions.
For any pair of candidates i, j, we will be frequently using the following upper bounds on ci:
ci ≤ cj + di,j, (4)
ci ≤ cj + di,j
2
whenever i beats j. (5)
Inequality (4) is simply by the triangle inequality, while Inequality (5) also uses the fact that half
of the voters are closer to i, and at most the remaining half can contribute to the cost gap.
Let (x, y) be the election maximizing rx,y, having rx,y = 3 − δ. Without loss of generality,
assume that y = w(x, y) and dx,y = 2. Because cy = (3 − δ)cx and cy ≤ cx + dx,y2 = cx + 1, we
obtain that
cx ≤ 1
2− δ . (6)
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As before, let X be the set of voters closer to x than to y, and Y = X the set closer to y. Then,
pX ≤ 12 ≤ pY . Following our intuition from the proof of Lemma 14, we partition the points into
three disjoint sets A, B and C. Specifically, we will choose (later) a parameter p close to 1/2. As
before, the set A captures the points that are “roughly equidistant” between x and y; specifically:
A = {i | di,y ≤ di,x ≤ 1 + ρA} ⊆ Y , where we will choose ρA so that pA = p. The set B captures
the points “close to” x: B = {i | di,x ≤ ρB} ⊆ X, where we choose ρB so that pB = p.7 The
set C consists of the remaining points C = A ∪B. (C may contain points from both X and Y ,
and pC = 1 − 2p.) Observe that the closer p is to 1/2, the larger ρA and ρB will be, and we will
have less control over where the points in A and B are located. Contrast this with the proof of
Lemma 14, where the very stringent assumption of δ = 0 allowed us to choose p = 1/2 and still
obtain ρA = ρB = 0.
We use the fact that cx ≈ 12 to derive that close to half of the probability mass must be in
A, and close to half in B. To lower-bound the probability mass, notice that the cost of x can be
lower-bounded term-by-term as follows:
1. All points in B contribute cost at least 0.
2. All points in X \B contribute cost at least ρB .
3. All points in A contribute cost at least 1.
4. All points in Y \A contribute cost at least 1 + ρA.
We can thus lower bound cx as follows:
1
2− δ ≥ cx ≥ (pX − pB)ρB + pA · 1 + (pY − pA)(1 + ρA) = pXρB + pY (1 + ρA)− pBρB − pAρA
≥ 1
2
ρB +
1
2
(1 + ρA)− pBρB − pAρA = 1
2
+ (
1
2
− p)(ρA + ρB).
This implies that ρA + ρB ≤ δ(2−δ)(1−2p) . In particular, notice that even while choosing the desired
probability p very close to half (e.g., p = 1/2−O(√δ)), the cost bound still guarantees that such a p
is achieved with small radii: ρA + ρB = O(
√
δ). For notational convenience, we use ρ = δ(2−δ)(1−2p)
to denote the upper bound for ρA + ρB, so ρB ≤ ρA + ρB ≤ ρ.
The expected distortion can now be broken into terms based on the three partitions A,B,C.
C (D,p,p) = 2pC (pA + pB)Ei∼pC ,j∼pA∪B [ri,j] + p2C · C (D,pC ,p) + p2B · C (D,pB ,p)
+ 2pApBEi∼pA,j∼pB [ri,j] + p
2
A · C (D,pA,p)
We bound the terms in the sum separately.
• Ei∼pC ,j∼pA∪B [ri,j ] ≤ 3−δ, simply because we assumed that the worst-case pairwise distortion
of any election was 3− δ.
• The same bound of 3− δ applies to C (D,pC ,p), for the same reason.
7 Notice that such ρA, ρB exist without loss of generality. For if there were a radius ρ such that — say —
B◦ = {i | di,x < ρ} had pB◦ < p, while B = {i | di,x ≤ ρ} had pB > p, we could split a point i on the boundary (that
is, i satisfies di,x = ρ) into two points, without affecting any outcomes for the instance.
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• When both candidates i, j are drawn from B, assume that i wins while j has lower social
cost. We can use Inequalities (5) (for i and j) and (4) (for j and x, the latter having cost at
least 12) to bound
ci
cj
≤ cj +
di,j
2
cj
≤ 1 + ρB
cj
≤ 1 + ρB
1/2− ρB =
1
1− 2ρB .
We apply Lemma 11, and obtain that
C (D,pB,p) ≤ 1
2
(
1 +
1
1− 2ρB
)
=
1− ρB
1− 2ρB ≤
1− ρ
1− 2ρ .
• The most difficult term to bound is
2pApBEi∼pA,j∼pB [ri,j ] + p
2
A · Ei,j∼pA [ri,j] = p2 · Ei,j∼pA,b∼pB [ri,b + rj,b + ri,j] .
Similar to the proof of Lemma 14, we define ∆i,j,b = ri,b + rj,b + ri,j, and upper-bound ∆i,j,b
for all i, j ∈ A and b ∈ B by a quantity which tends to 5 as p → 1/2 and ρ → 0. The proof
of the following lemma involves an intricate case analysis, and is relegated to the end of this
section.
Lemma 15 ∆i,j,b ≤ 1 + 2 · 21−ρ · 1−p+ρ+pρp(1−ρ) for all i, j ∈ A and b ∈ B.
Substituting all the upper bounds into the expected distortion, we obtain that
C (D,p,p) ≤ 2pC · (3− δ) + p2B ·
1− ρ
1− 2ρ + p
2 ·max
i,j,b
∆i,j,b
≤ 2(1 − 2p) · (3− δ) + p2 · 1− ρ
1− 2ρ + p
2
(
1 + 2 · 2
1− ρ ·
1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ)
)
Substituting p = 1−
√
δ
2 (which may not be optimal), we get ρ =
√
δ
2−δ , and a tedious manual
calculation8 using the observation that 2−√δ − δ = (1−√δ)(2 +√δ) gives an upper bound of
C (D,p,p) ≤ 48 + 196δ
0.5 − 348δ − 287δ1.5 + 275δ2 + 193δ2.5 − 39δ3 − 46δ3.5 − 8δ4
32(1 + δ0.5/2)2(1− δ0.5)(1− δ0.5 − δ/2) .
Dropping dominated terms (negative in the numerator, positive in the denominator), this expression
can be upper-bounded by
C (D,p,p) ≤ 48 + 196
√
δ
32(1 +
√
δ/2)2(1− 2√δ + δ/2) .
Finally, using the upper bound δ ≤ 1100 , we obtain that
C (D,p,p) ≤ (3
2
+
49
8
√
δ)/(1− 9
8
√
δ) ≤ (3
2
+
49
8
√
δ) · (1 + 90
71
√
δ) ≤ 3
2
+ 9
√
δ.
This completes the proof of Lemma 13.
8or some help from Mathematica
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Proof of Lemma 15. Note that, for all i ∈ A and b ∈ B, we have
1− ρB ≤ di,x − dx,b ≤ di,b ≤ di,x + dx,b ≤ 1 + ρA + ρB .
In the proof of Lemma 14, the three key properties were that (1) x was socially optimal, (2)
any i ∈ A was at most thrice worse than x, and (3) if i ∈ A beat x in a pairwise election, then it
was at most twice worse than x. The relaxed versions of these key properties are the following:
1. Every b ∈ B is close to socially optimal: For all i ∈ A and b ∈ B,
cb
ci
=
pAdb,A + pBdb,B + pCdb,C
pAdi,A + pBdi,B + pCdi,C
≤ (1− pB)di,b + pBdb,B
pBdi,B
≤ (1− pB)(1 + ρA + ρB) + pB2ρB
pB(1− ρB) ≤
(1− p)(1 + ρ) + 2pρ
p(1− ρ) =
1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ) .
The first inequality is obtained by bounding db,A ≤ db,i + di,A and db,C ≤ db,i + di,C , then
subtracting di,ApA + di,CpC from both the numerator and denominator. The next step uses
that 1 − ρB ≤ di,b ≤ 1 + ρA + ρB. This ratio is at least 1 and approaches 1 as ρ → 0 and
p → 12 .
2. For all i ∈ A and b ∈ B (regardless of who wins the pairwise election between them),
ci
cb
≤ cb + di,b
cb
≤ 1 + 1 + ρA + ρB
cb
≤ 1 + 1 + ρ1
2(1− ρ)
=
3 + ρ
1− ρ .
This ratio is at least 3 and approaches 3 as ρ → 0.
3. For any i ∈ A that wins the pairwise election against b ∈ B,
ci
cb
≤ cb +
di,b
2
cb
≤ 1 +
1
2 (1 + ρA + ρB)
cb
≤ 1 +
1
2(1 + ρ)
1
2(1− ρ)
=
2
1− ρ .
This ratio is at least 2 and approaches 2 as ρ → 0.
We now fix i, j ∈ A and b ∈ B, and upper-bound ∆i,j,b through a detailed case analysis based on
who wins (and is socially better) in the three elections (i, j), (i, b), (j, b). Without loss of generality,
we assume that i wins the election against j. Throughout the analysis, as in the proof of Lemma 14,
we use repeatedly that t
cb
+ ci
t
is a convex function of t, and in particular is maximized at t = ci or
t = cb.
1. If the socially better candidate wins in at least two of the three elections, then ∆i,j,b ≤
1 + 1 + 3− δ = 5− δ, because the third election can have distortion at most 3− δ.
2. If both i and j lose to b,
∆i,j,b ≤ 2
(
max
i∈A,b∈B
cb
ci
)
+ 3− δ ≤ 2 · 1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ) + 3− δ.
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3. If both i and j beat b, then we obtain
∆i,j,b = max{ ci
cb
, 1} +max{cj
cb
, 1} +max{ ci
cj
, 1}.
Because we are not in the first case, at most one of the three maxima can be 1. There are
three orderings of the social costs cb, ci, cj which are consistent with these assumptions:
(a) If cb ≤ ci ≤ cj , then
∆i,j,b =
ci
cb
+
cj
cb
+ 1 ≤ 1 + 2 · 2
1− ρ .
(b) If cb ≤ cj ≤ ci, then
∆i,j,b =
ci
cb
+
cj
cb
+
ci
cj
≤ ci
cb
+ 1 +
ci
cb
≤ 1 + 2 · 2
1− ρ .
(c) If cj ≤ cb ≤ ci, then
∆i,j,b =
ci
cb
+ 1 +
ci
cj
≤ 1 +
(
max
i∈A,b∈B,i beats b
ci
cb
)(
1 + max
j∈A,b∈B
cb
cj
)
≤ 1 + 2
1− ρ ·
(
1 +
1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ)
)
.
4. If i beats b and j loses to b, then
∆i,j,b = max{ ci
cb
, 1} +max{cb
cj
, 1} +max{ ci
cj
, 1}.
Again, because at least two of the three pairwise elections result in the socially worse candidate
winning, we have only three cost orderings consistent with the outcome:
(a) If cj ≤ ci ≤ cb, then
∆i,j,b = 1 +
cb
cj
+
ci
cj
≤ 1 + 1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ) + 3− δ.
(b) If cb ≤ cj ≤ ci, then
∆i,j,b =
ci
cb
+ 1 +
ci
cj
≤ 1 + 2
1− ρ ·
(
1 +
1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ)
)
,
as in Case 3(c).
(c) If cj ≤ cb ≤ ci, then
∆i,j,b =
ci
cb
+
cb
cj
+
ci
cj
≤ 1 + 2 · ci
cj
≤ 1 + 2
(
max
i∈A,b∈B,i beats b
ci
cb
· max
j∈A,b∈B
cb
cj
)
≤ 1 + 2 · 2
1− ρ ·
1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ) ,
where the first inequality again used the convexity argument on ci
cb
+ cb
cj
.
20
5. In the final case, i loses to b and j beats b, resulting in a cycle in the election results. We
now have
∆i,j,b = max{cb
ci
, 1} +max{cj
cb
, 1} +max{ ci
cj
, 1}.
Again, we have three possible cost orderings consistent with the assumption that at most one
of the pairwise elections agrees with the social costs:
(a) If cj ≤ ci ≤ cb, then
∆i,j,b =
cb
ci
+ 1 +
ci
cj
≤ 1 + 1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ) + 3− δ.
(b) If ci ≤ cb ≤ cj , then
∆i,j,b =
cb
ci
+
cj
cb
+ 1 ≤ 1 + 1− p + ρ + pρ
p(1− ρ) +
2
1− ρ .
(c) In the final case cb ≤ cj ≤ ci, we again apply the convexity argument to bound
∆i,j,b = 1 +
cj
cb
+
ci
cj
≤ 1 + 1 + ci
cb
≤ 2 + 3 + ρ
1− ρ .
Collecting all the upper bounds in all cases, we see that they are all equal to (or immediately
upper-bounded by) one of the following three terms:
2 · 1−p+ρ+pρ
p(1−ρ) + 3− δ for cases (1), (2), (4a), (5a)
1 + 2 · 21−ρ for cases (3a), (3b), (5b), (5c)
1 + 2 · 21−ρ · 1−p+ρ+pρp(1−ρ) for cases (3c), (4b), (4c)
A somewhat tedious calculation shows that because p ≤ 12 , the expressions in the first and
second cases are always bounded by the expression in the third case. This completes the proof of
Lemma 15.
6 Discussion and Open Questions
We showed that under the simple model of two i.i.d. candidates and a majority election between
them, government by the people is better for the people if it is also of the people: there is a constant
gap between the distortion caused by voting in the case when q = p vs. q 6= p. For the case of the
line, we pinned down the gap precisely, while for general metric spaces, we proved a small constant
gap.
Our results can be construed as providing some mathematical underpinnings for the benefits of
lottocracy. Lottocracy (also called sortition) [16, 21, 22] refers to systems of government in which
(some) political officials are chosen through lotteries instead of (or in addition to) elections. Two of
the arguments put forth in favor of lottocracy are: (1) it is more inclusive [22], in the sense that the
office holders will be more representative of the population as a whole and its different subgroups;
(2) it leads to more responsive government [21]: because office holders are representative of the
population, they will respond more directly to the preferences of the population. The definition
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of inclusiveness is very closely aligned with our notion of candidates being “of the people;” it is
sometimes justified by empirical and simulation studies giving evidence that inclusive groups may
be better at problem solving. The notion of responsiveness is similar to our notion of government
being “for the people;” in this sense, our results could be — with some latitude — rephrased as
stating that inclusiveness may lead to responsiveness.
While most proponents of lottocracy argue in favor of filling offices with randomly selected
citizens, our analysis applies to a process wherein voters do have a say, but the slate of candidates
is random. Allowing a vote between randomly selected candidates may in fact address one of the
main concerns about lottocracy, namely, the competency of candidates [21, 22]. It simultaneously
addresses a concern about democratic votes: that the slate of candidates could be such that voters
make a societally suboptimal choice. While the mathematical model presented here is far too
simplistic to provide reliable insights into the merits (or problems) of lottocracy and its variants,
it may serve as a point of departure for future more refined models.
In terms of more direct technical questions, the most immediate open question is to obtain the
maximum expected distortion in general metric spaces. We conjecture an upper bound of 3/2.
Our conjecture is based on extensive computational experiments, and on several partial results. In
particular, we can show that the distortion is upper-bounded by 3/2 whenever the metric is uniform
(i.e., all voters/candidates are equidistant), or when there is a location of the metric space that
has half the voters/candidates. Both properties seem to naturally arise in worst-case constructions,
although we are unable to prove at this point that they are necessary for worst-case metrics.
Beyond the immediate open question, our work raises a number of other directions for future
work. A first natural question is how the distortion depends on the metric space. As we saw, the
distortion for the line is 4 − 2√2 < 32 . What is the distortion for d-dimensional Euclidean space?
Are there other natural metric spaces that are suitable models of political or similar affiliation, and
may be amenable to a detailed analysis?
In this work, in order to isolate the issue of representativeness of candidates, we focused on a
majority election between two candidates. When k > 2 candidates are running, vote aggregation
becomes more complex, and indeed, a large number of different voting rules have been considered
throughout history. The work of Anshelevich et al. [2, 3] analyzed the worst-case distortion of some
of the most prevalent voting rules. It would be interesting to examine the performance of these
voting rules under our model of candidates drawn from the voter population. In particular, would
such an analysis reveal a more fine-grained stratification between some of the voting rules that
perform equally well (or poorly) under worst-case assumptions?
A further direction is to deviate from the extremes of worst-case candidates or candidates drawn
from the voter distribution. How gracefully does the distortion degrade as the voter and candidate
distributions become more and more dissimilar? Answering this question first requires a suitable
definition of a distance metric between probability distributions. Such a definition will have to be
“Earthmover-like,” yet also “scale-invariant.”
Acknowledgments
Yu Cheng is supported in part by Shang-Hua Teng’s Simons Investigator Award. Shaddin Dughmi
is supported by NSF CAREER award CCF-1350900 and NSF Grant CCF-1423618. David Kempe is
supported in part by NSF Grant CCF-1423618 and NSF Grant IIS-1619458. The authors would like
to thank Elliot Anshelevich and Utkash Dubey for useful conversations, and anonymous reviewers
for helpful feedback.
22
References
[1] Elliot Anshelevich. Ordinal approximation in matching and social choice. ACM SIGecom
Exchanges, 15(1):60–64, July 2016.
[2] Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, and John Postl. Approximating optimal social choice
under metric preferences. In Proc. 30th AAAI Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, pages 777–783,
2015.
[3] Elliot Anshelevich and John Postl. Randomized social choice functions under metric prefer-
ences. In Proc. 31st Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, pages 46–59, 2016.
[4] Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar. Blind, greedy, and random: Algorithms for matching and
clustering using only ordinal information. In Proc. 31st AAAI Conf. on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 390–396, 2016.
[5] Kenneth Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, 1951.
[6] Salvador Barbera`. An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions. Social Choice
and Welfare, 18:619–653, 2001.
[7] Salvador Barbera`, Faruk Gul, and Ennio Stacchetti. Generalized median voter schemes and
committees. Journal of Economic Theory, 61:262–289, 1993.
[8] Duncan Black. On the rationale of group decision making. J. Political Economy, 56:23–34,
1948.
[9] Duncan Black. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press, 1958.
[10] Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simi Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Or Sheffet.
Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view. Artificial Intelligence, 227:190–213, 2015.
[11] Craig Boutilier and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Incomplete information and communication in
voting. In Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Je´roˆme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia,
editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 10, pages 223–257. Cambridge
University Press, 2016.
[12] Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Je´roˆme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia, editors.
Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
[13] Ioannis Caragiannis and Ariel D. Procaccia. Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite
limited communication. Artificial Intelligence, 175(9):1655–1671, 2011.
[14] Jean-Charles de Borda. Me´moire sur les e´lections au scrutin. Histoire de l’Acade´mie Royale
des Sciences, Paris, pages 657–665, 1784.
[15] M. J. A. Nicolas de Condorcet. Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a` la probabilite´ des de´cisions
rendues a` la pluralite´ des voix. Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1785.
[16] Oliver Dowlen. The political potential of sortition: A study of the random selection of citizens
for public office. Imprint Academic, 2008.
23
[17] Anthony Downs. An economic theory of political action in a democracy. The Journal of
Political Economy, 65(2):135–150, 1957.
[18] Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, and Iddan Golomb. On voting and facility location.
arXiv:1512.05868, 2015.
[19] Alan F. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica, 41(4):587–
601, 1973.
[20] Ashish Goel, Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, and Kamesh Munagala. Metric distortion of
social choice rules: Lower bounds and fairness properties. arXiv:1612.02912, 2016.
[21] Alexander A. Guerrero. Against elections: The lottocratic alternative. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 42(2):135–178, 2014.
[22] He´le`ne Landemore. Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic inclusiveness: An epis-
temic argument for the random selection of representatives. Synthese, 190(7):1209–1231, 2013.
[23] Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman. A unified theory of voting: Directional and proximity
spatial models. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[24] Herve´ Moulin. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35:437– 455, 1980.
[25] Ariel D. Procaccia. Can approximation circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite? In Proc. 25th
AAAI Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, pages 836–841, 2010.
[26] Ariel D. Procaccia and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. The distortion of cardinal preferences in voting.
In Proc. 10th Int. Workshop Cooperative Inform. Agents X, pages 317–331, 2006.
[27] Diana Richards, Whitman A. Richards, and Brendan McKay. Collective choice and mutual
knowledge structures. Advances in Complex Systems, 1:221–236, 1998.
[28] Mark A. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspon-
dence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic The-
ory, 10:187–217, 1975.
24
